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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the concept of strategic groups focusing upon
the importance of intra-indus try strategic groupings in understanding
differences across firms within an industry. The problems involved in
identifying strategic groups within industries are examined through a
comprehensive review of recent studies. It is demonstrated that much
of the research has used surrogates for elements of a firm's strategic
direction, e.g., finance, marketing, R&D strategy, etc», to suggest
bases by which creative and sustainable groups are formed.
The authors argue that certain theoretical concepts such as mobility
barriers
,
isolating mechanisms and controllable variables provide much
firmer bases for identifying strategic groups within industries. Thus,
taxonomies for structuring processes of strategic group formulation can
be developed. Implications of the strategic group concept for such
strategic issues as the structure-performance linkage , firm mobility,
patterns of rivalry and firm growth are then examined. The paper con-
cludes by indicating fruitful directions for strategic group research
in the context of the strategic management field.

FIRMS, INDUSTRIES, AND MARKETS
There has been much controversy and discussion in Che literature
of industrial organization about whether the firm or industry or some
other intra-industry group stratification is the appropriate unit for
analysis. More recent developments in oligopoly theory have done much
to resurrect interest in analysis at the firm level by concentrating
on interactions in markets where one firm's action affect its rivals.
Such theoretical developments have filled the 'gaping hole' left by
economists' traditional focus on the two polar cases of pure com-
petition and pure monopoly. However, the indeterminacy of the oligo-
polistic game within the traditional constrained optimization static
equilibrium framework has made it difficult to drive the analysis
towards any useful conclusion.
Most firms are multiproduct , sell in more than one market, and have
grown by diversification. The industry as conventionally understood
produces a range of different products all of which are not close sub-
stitutes, and uses a variety of technical production processes. It
therefore becomes unclear where the boundaries of the industry should
be drawn. However, two criteria are commonly used to define these
boundaries: markets and technologies. The market criterion is used to
include within a specific industry those products which are sufficiently
similar as to be close substitutes in the eye of the buyer, the simi-
larity being the familiar cross-elasticity of demand. The technological
criterion (e.g., Andrews (1951)) focuses upon the classification of
industries according to their similarity of processes. Breaks in the
chain of cross elasticities of supply (rather than demand) are examined
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in order to identify the boundaries of the industry. Unfortunately,
neither approach is able to specify at what point in the spectrum of
demand or supply cross-elasticities the industry boundary line should
be drawn. This imprecision in industry definition is probably unavoid-
able. For example, Chamberlin (1951) advanced the idea that an industry
was not a definite economic entity but an analytical tool which could
be used with varying degrees of generality.
Many economists have concluded that the concepts of market and
industry should be viewed as complementary and the emphasis employed
should reflect the problems under consideration. According to Joan
Robinson (1956):
"Questions relating to competition, monopoly and
oligopoly must be considered in terms of markets,
whilst questions concerning labour, profits, tech-
nical progress, localisation and so forth have to
be considered in terms of industries."
In an economic environment characterized by widespread product dif-
ferentiation and technological change, it is not at all clear where one
industry ends and another begins. Many large firms are capable of pro-
ducing an extremely wide range of products and can potentially enter
and compete in a number of different industries. On purely technologi-
cal grounds, products can be made which compete for the same customers
but which embody different technologies and which are produced by dif-
ferent processes. Moreover when undertaking an empirical investigation,
it may be difficult to decide to which industries some firms should be
assigned. In practice these insoluble problems are resolved on an indi-
vidual basis, with the definitions employed being adapted to each spe-
cific situation.
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The purpose of this paper is Co re-examine these issues. In par-
ticular, a concept of a finer grouping than the industry has recently
become popular (Porter (1980)). This appears to be a supply side con-
cept in that it seeks to identify groupings or structures within
industries, but it is in fact based on the observed similarity of beha-
vior of firms. These groups are called strategic groups because of the
criteria by which they are observed. They are essentially long term in
nature and costly to reverse and are relatively tightly drawn struc-
tures within the more loosely drawn industry structure of conventional
theory. If such groups exist they will clearly have implications for
the patterns of competition within industries, will contribute to our
understanding of oligopolistic interdependence, and may enrich the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organization
theory. For the business policy researcher and for the business stra-
tegist, strategic groups offer a distinctive slant on the identification
of relative competitive position and suggest a systematic and compre-
hensive way of conducting a strengths and weaknesses analysis in terms
of the framework of relative competitive advantage.
STRATEGIC GROUPS - THE EARLY DEFINITIONS AND MORE RECENT STUDIES
The main studies in the area of strategic groups are summarized in
Table 1 and discussed in the following paragraphs.
Insert Table 1 about here
The terra "strategic groups" was coined by Michael S. Hunt in his
doctoral dissertation (1972) to contribute to his explanation of the
performance of the "white goods" industry in the 1960 's. Hunt observed
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that there were three sources of asymmetry between firms within the
"white goods" industry: the extent of vertical integration, degree
of product diversification and differences in product differentiation.
This asymmetry resulted in four strategic groups : (i) full-line
national manufacturers' brand producers, (ii) part-line national manu-
facturers' brand producers, (iii) private brand producers, and (iv)
national retailers. His rationale for this grouping was that it "mini-
mized economic asymmetry within each group," Hunt (1972: 57). He
argued that the problems facing the potential entrant differed depend-
ing on which group he intended to enter, and Hunt therefore attempted
to isolate "barriers to entry to each strategic group" in a descriptive
vein.
Howard H. Newman (1973) in his doctoral dissertation, applied the
same principles in a statistical examination of 34 four digit "producer-
goods" industries all of which were related to "chemical processes."
Michael E. Porter (1973) also analyzed statistically a sample of 38
three digit "consumer-goods" industries in his doctoral dissertation.
While Hunt focussed on strategic differences among competitors
in their principal markets and delineated groups according to symmetry
(homogeneity) of operations within the same basic businesses, Newman
asserted that strategic groups can also be "defined and identified
by the relationship between the industry at hand and the activities
carried out by its member firms outside that industry" (1978: 418).
It follows at once, he said, that those firms sharing the same basic
business can be placed in the same strategic group while firms operat-
ing in the industry but having their principal business in a different
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industry form a different group. To a substantial degree therefore,
strategic groups "turn out to be defined by their differing degrees of
vertical integration with the market in question" (1978: 419). His
analysis showed "that differing base industries and patterns of ver-
tical integration sufficed to stratify rival sellers into subgroups,
"but," as he himself pointed out, it left "open the question of what
other operational factors may prove sufficient both theoretically and
empirically for distinguishing them" (1978: 425).
Porter (1973) proceeded by "using the relative size of a firm in
its industry as a proxy for its strategic group membership," dividing
firms in each industry into two categories defined as industry leaders
and followers . He argued that "the leader/follower dichotomy may
be particularly apt for dichotomizing strategic groups in a sample
restricted to consumer goods industries," because "while the configur-
ation of strategic groups will vary from industry to industry, the
leader group should encompass those strategic groups in the industry
which are characterized by strategies potentially achieving economies
of scale in production technology, vertical integration, captive
distribution, in-house repair and service facilities, national adver-
tising, and so on if these economies exist in the industry. The leader
group should also encompass strategic groups with broad product lines
and large sales forces. The follower group, on the other hand, is
likely to encompass strategic groups composed of firms following spe-
cialist or narrow-line strategies, regional strategies, non-integrated
strategies and so on. Thus the leader/follower distinction captures
some of the variance among strategic groups," Porter (1979: 220-221).
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Kenneth J. Hatten in his doctoral dissertation (1974) on the U.S.
Brewing Industry 1952-1971, paid greater attention to the methodology
for establishing intra-group homogeneity and variance between groups.
He argued that the earlier researchers (Hunt, Newman, Porter) had
focussed on groups, not on firms, and in spite of considerable atten-
tion to the assumption of homogeneity within an industry across firms,
they had not tested for homogeneity on a firm by firm basis. Hatten
therefore began with case studies of firms in the brewing industry from
which he concluded that brewers competed by allocating resources to two
principal functional areas: manufacturing and marketing. He therefore
specified an eight variable model, relating return on equity (perfor-
mance) to three manufacturing variables (number, age, and capital
intensity of plants), three marketing variables (number of brands,
price, and receivables/sales) and two structural variables (8-firm con-
centration ratio, and firm size).
His first step in the statistical analysis was to develop disparate
internally homogeneous groups. He argued that "The process must begin
with an untested assumption: since the current state of art in sta-
tistical theory cannot cope with simultaneous non-homogeneity across
firms (sections) and across time, a decision must be made to assume
homogeneity over time or across sections. Since our interest was the
firm and because it seemed more likely that the brewing industry would
be homogeneous across time, the research began with that assumption,"
(Hatten and Schendel (1977: 101)). He believed that it was difficult
to decide which firms to group together (because one firm may be homo-
geneous with one or more other firms), although it could be done in
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accord with a priori theory using criteria such as size (as Porter did)
or types of market served. He resolved this problem by using a cluster
programme to determine the distance between firms. Then he conducted
a regression analysis which demonstrated that important differences
existed between the pooled estimates (the industry model) and the esti-
mates made on the clusters (the disparate but internally homogeneous
groups). The next step was to relax the assumption about industry homo-
geneity across time. The main problem then was to select the appropriate
breakpoint (year); for this a content analysis of the industry served
as a guide.
Hatten and Schendel's (1977) conclusion was that "attention to
homogeneity" revealed information that would otherwise be obfuscated:
they thus believed they had discovered a useful methodology for iso-
lating strategic groups. They also argued that the identification of
strategic groups could help management evaluate proposed strategies and
check the usefulness of conventional wisdom in specific competitive
situations, Hatten et al (1978: 592). They stressed that:
"The notion of strategy leads to the expectation that,
within a given industry or set of markets, different
competitors with different resources should choose
different means to attain their ends. Among other
indications, this suggests that industry level models
and indiscriminate pooling of data can produce results
that are easily misled if used at the firm level. It
also suggests that in the real world there really are
different ways of "skinning a cat," the firm too quick
to copy a successful competitor, one which tries to
emulate its competitors without careful thought, may
overlook its own capabilities and work against its
strengths" (1978: 608).
One of the limitations of the Hatten study was that it was confined to
firms competing in the same environment, namely, the brewing industry.
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This industry was selected to control the product-market variable
(diversification) at a low and non-significant level. With all chosen
firms being undiversif ied, single-business units, the study was per-
force reduced to one of "business strategy" (strategy variables con-
cerned with operations) and not "corporate strategy" encompassing
product-market and geographical diversification and horizontal and ver-
tical integration.
Caves and Pugel (1980) follow Porter (1973, 1979) in using firm size
as an indicator of strategic group membership. They found that small
firms were more profitable in some of the industries which they studied.
Oster (1982) used one element of a firm's conduct, its product strat-
egy, as the basis for group differentiation. She argued that there may
be persistent differences across firms in terms of advertising strate-
gies (as measured by the advertising to sales ratio). She assigned
firms to strategic groups in an industry in a given year (1978: 378)
based upon whether its advertising to sales ratio was (1) below or
above the industry average for that year, (2) in the bottom versus the
top of the industry distribution for that year. She also examined the
extent of stability in these differences over time in order to under-
stand processes of group change. She concluded that while the iden-
tification of strategic groups is a judgmental process it does enrich
our understanding of the workings of some consumer goods industries.
For example, she found that it is the long-term durability of a firm's
advertising investment strategy which maintains the group structure.
This is consistent with the notion of advertising as a strong entry
deterrent and barrier to mobility within consumer goods industries.
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Ryans and Wittink (198.2) use finance theory and the capital asset
pricing model as their framework for group identification. They argue
that if two or more firms are in the same strategic group, then their
stock prices should tend to move together. They qualify this argument
by stressing that it is more likely to hold for industries in which the
participants are essentially one-industry firms and over a sufficiently
long-time period so that particular internal or external industry dif-
ferences do not have a disproportionate effect on security prices.
They studied the airline industry and showed that the trunk airlines
grouped together. Regional or intra-state airlines had no consistent
overall clustering pattern but tended to group most frequently with
another similar airline.
Baird and Sudharsan (1983) used a three-mode factor analysis to
cluster participants in the office equipment/electronic computing
industry according to certain financial accounting variables such as
leverage and return on assets. They identify several different and
rather stable groups in this industry which appear to differ with
respect to their financial policies and strategies.
Primeaux (1983) hypothesized that investment behavior (measured by
net capital expenditures) may be an important variable by which the
life cycle stage of an industry may first be identified. He links
the life cycle and strategic group concepts and shows that strategic
groups, using a relative size measure, can be assessed for particular
industries as a function of the industry life cycle stage. Primeaux
compares his strategic group method with Porter's (1973, 1979) approach
in relation to the textile and petroleum industries. While Primeaux's
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results appear to be superior for the petroleum industry, Porter's
results are better for the textile industry. Primeaux concludes, inter
alia, that current research has not determined the most appropriate
approach for determining strategic group membership and that future re-
search must concentrate upon finding reliable and consistent approaches
for strategic group identification.
Howell and Frazier (1983) use Abell's (1980) criteria for business
definition to form strategic groups in the hospital supply industry.
Using the degree of scope and differentiation on the customer groups
and needs dimensions, they conceptualize strategic groups in terms of
traditional marketing decisions and variables. They conclude that such
marketing strategy variables have an important impact on the firm's
strategic choice and positioning.
The merit of these and other contributions is their recognition
that differences between firms do exist and that they may be the delib-
erate outcome of decisions made by firms. Groupings may therefore be
the result of strategic choices. However, many of the current studies
(including a large number of those which could be described as being
data-driven) raise the question of whether many of the factors which
identify groups are in fact purposively manipulated by the organiza-
tion. Borrowing from a biological perspective and an adaptive strategy
viewpoint (Boulding (1956), Pondy and Mitroff (1979) and Chaffee
(1983)) it can be argued that group membership is merely an observable
manifestation of viable niches in the environment and the organization's
ability to adapt to them. Organizations which exhibit certain survival
traits which cannot be known completely in advance, remain.
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Each of these contributions deployed the group concept in pursuit
of the explanation of the level and variation of profits within an
industry. Another difficulty apparent is the ad hoc nature of the
definition of strategic groups, product lines from Hunt, vertical
integration from Newman, relative size from Porter, product strategy
from Oster, financial strategy from Ryans and Witt ink. and Eaird and
Sudharsan, investment behavior from Primeaux and marketing/business
definition strategy from Howell and Frazier. Hatten paid attention
to the methodological issues outlining a process by which homogeneity
between firms could be tested. The issue of what dimensions to employ
was resolved by case study analysis of the firms involved. If strategic
groups are to be something more than an ad hoc construction which can
conveniently soak up some of the variability in the dependent variables
in our analyses of industries then we need a more careful specification
of the sources of dissimilarity between firms— a taxonomy incorporating
such concepts as mobility barriers (Caves and Porter, 1977) and iso-
lating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1981).
A TAXONOMY INVOLVING MOBILITY BARRIERS AND ISOLATING MECHANISMS
The natural way to assign firms to strategic groups is by reference
to the characteristics of their competitive strategies with group mem-
bers displaying similar strategies and differences between groups being
relatively sharp. In Caves and Porter's (1977) words "firms within a
group resemble one another closely and recognize their mutual depen-
dence most sensitively." This begs the important question of how to
identify the range of strategies available to a firm.
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In industrial organization theory, the key characteristics of the
structure of an industry are encapsulated in the idea of entry barriers,
and market power is said to stem from the presence of structural or
behavioral barriers to the entry of new competition. This argument
applies also for strategic groups. A firm within a group makes strate-
gic decisions which cannot readily be imitated by firms outside the
group without substantial costs, significant elapsed time, or uncer-
tainty about the outcome of those decisions. These barriers to casual
imitation by firms outside the group, and the definition of group,
requires the existence of such barriers. Mobility barriers and the
associated costs of mobility have become the accepted phraseology.
Recognizing that these mobility barriers (or group specific entry
barriers) afford protection to group members, it is natural to envisage
the key strategic variables as those which affect the height of mobility
2
barriers."
Classification of groups by their mobility barriers (or through
notions of idiosyncratic capital and isolating mechanisms) is an
appealing idea which stresses the cost advantages enjoyed by group mem-
bers and emphasizes the elapsed time as well as the investment expen-
ditures required of would-be "entrants" to overcome the barriers. In
just the same way as in the traditional exposition of entry barrier
theory, mobility barriers represent for the group members an investment
in a collective, sometimes intangible, capital asset whose benefits are
shared out between group members. Ex ante, the investment decision is
risky insofar as the costs are irrecoverable. Resale markets may exist
for plant and equipment and for upstream supply companies for example,
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but differentiation costs are not so easily recovered nor are invest-
ments in R&D.
Mobility barriers can be expressed in the same form as conventional
entry barriers; "barriers to mobility between groups rest on the same
structural features as barriers to entry into any group from the out-
side," (Caves and Porter (1979)). Thus the group counterpart expresses
barriers either as absolute costs of movement from one group to another
(becoming vertically integrated for example), or as the operating cost
penalty relative to the incumbents that the entrant must face. In
either case the present value of the incremental costs associated with
changing group membership detracts significantly from the profit margin
available before taking into account any competitive reaction.
Sources of Mobilitv Barriers
Mobility barriers fall into three broad categories as shown in
Table 2: market-related strategies, the characteristics of supply in
the industry, and features specific to the ownership and management of
the individual firm. Market related strategies include the product
line, its width and scope; the geographical coverage of the market and
the nature of market segments served; the channels of distribution
employed and the relationships with buyers; the technologies embodied
in the product; and the nature and type of branding and product dif-
ferentiation in general. These are clearly decision variables for the
firm. But more than this they represent strategic choices insofar as
a competitive riposte requires an initial investment cost and some
elapsed time before competition on equal terras becomes possible. More-
over, the "investment" decision is risky in that it is not certain that
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equivalent or better market positioning can be acquired by the follower,
or whether the market will respond to imitative strategies in the same
way.
Insert Table 2 about here
The characteristics of supply include the scale economies arising
from size whether in production or in marketing or in administration;
and the range of assets that could be invested in "supply"—manufac-
turing capability, technological capability, marketing and distribution
systems, and R&D expenditure. Scale effects are both conventional and
familiar. More interesting, however, are the alternative investments
in supply-side assets for the firm. These can be difficult to define
with precision (what is an R&D capability?) and thus can be difficult
to copy, certainly in the short run. The idea of supply capabilities
relates directly to the idea of cross-entry and cross-elasticity of
supply. Competition is often observed to spring from firms outside
industry boundaries (e.g., Exxon entering the office automation
industry) because these entrants possess the inherent capabilities to
enter—for them the entry barriers are low—and moreover, they may have
considerable latitude in their choice of entry point. The barriers to
entry to the industry in general may be lower for some completely new
entrants than the mobility barriers which impede the repositioning of
incumbent firms.
Whereas supply capabilities may be generally available at a price,
mobility barriers arising from the nature of the firm itself rest on
characteristics internal to the firm.
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The firm's organizational production function can be thought of as
its organization structure and the skill of its management in employing
it efficiently. Chandler (1962) pointed out the systematic relation-
ship between strategic choices and organization structures, and Caves
(1980) recently surveyed the reverse set of relationships which run from
the firm's organizational structure to its market behavior. Management
skills are intimately related to organization structure. It was Bower
(1970) who highlighted the limitations on top management in formulating
and implementing strategic choices. "Definition and impetus in turn
depend on the 'situational content' of ... lower level decision makers.
Context consists of organization structure, meaning not only the organi-
zation chart assignment of responsibilities and powers but also the
organization's system of measuring and rewarding performance ..." (Caves
(1980)). These characteristics of structure, context and skill are not
easy to measure, particularly on only superficial acquaintance with the
units of analysis. Williamson's (1970) formulation of Chandler's ana-
lysis of the two prototype structure structures— the functional and
divisional—supplemented by Wrigley (1970) and Rumelt (1974)
—
provides
some guidelines for assessment. As Caves indicates, these contribu-
tions highlight the subjective and firm-specific nature of corporate
structure, and the organizational mechanisms for maintaining control
and direction.
The boundaries of firms can be a rich source of diversity within
an industry. The basic characteristics are the nature (related versus
unrelated) and extent of diversification, the extent of vertical integra-
tion, and the nature of contracts with supplying firms or with customers.
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Contracts, whether for technology or for materials and components
requirements, can yield significant operating advantages although the
time horizon over which these can be enjoyed may not always be very
long. Licensee arrangements can confer temporary advantage but when
regarded as a form of accelerated learning they can result in a more
durable form of technology advantage. Where significant cost savings
are available from vertically integrated systems then it is common
to observe that the large firms in an industry are all vertically
integrated, although the extent varies according to local circumstances
(viz., the pulp and paper industry). However, smaller firms search for
ways of offsetting the cost advantages of size, for example by pro-
viding high quality, high technology products to small insensitive
segments of the market. One strategy offsets another by, for example,
the raising of one mobility barrier against another strategic group.
Diversification may create cost savings, for example the management of
brands and families of brands across related markets or the sharing of
technologies across similar industrial processes. Of much debate has
been the proposition that there are economies of management arising from
divisionalized structures and from synergies due to pooling of talents
on related problems. Similarly diversification may reduce pockets of
excess capacity in management and administration where management is
purchased in indivisible lumps. Clearly, the extension or contraction
of the firm's boundaries or any change in the nature of its contractual
commitments requires time, is uncertain in its outcome, and is dif-
ficult to reverse. However, the boundary question is not merely one
of unit costs, it is also one of risk. Conventional portfolio theory
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argues that the pooling of urtcorrelated risks reduces overall risk.
In spite of the dissimilar nature of securities markets and the oppor-
tunity sets for corporate or business units, it may be possible to see
some significant risk reduction (e.g., lower risk of total default)
from a diversified portfolio. This can be important in a number of
ways. The perceived stakes may be quite different for diversified ver-
sus non-diversified companies and the nature of their strategic posi-
tioning may reflect this. The time horizon over which firms plan may
differ and the initiatives they consider may also vary. In general,
the objectives of firms with different boundaries may differ systemati-
cally, may be reflected in their competitive behavior, and could result
in different kinds of cost structure.
Ownership enables us to distinguish clearly between firms. The
obvious characteristics are extent of shareholding both privately held
and publicly quoted; nature of shareholders—family influence, country
of origin, multi-national, institutional holdings, and corporate inter-
connection; the nature of relationships with government—shareholding,
long term finance, subsidy or other favored treatment. Ownership mat-
ters because it affects the desired rate of return and the time horizon
over which this is to be earned. Ownership may intrude on the celebrated
divide between owners and managers in many more ways than conventional
Anglo-American thought suggests. It can affect the definition of the
business, in Abell's terminology
—
publicly owned industries in Europe
are severely restricted in the diversification moves that they might
consider. Cultural differences supported by different financial
systems may result in much more broadly based, loosely held industrial
groupings in Japan and West Germany, for example, than in the U.S.A.
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To summarize, firm specific sources of mobility barriers are:
organization structure and control systems, management skills and capa-
bilities, the nature and extent of diversification versus vertical
integration, and the nature of the firm's ownership and its connections
with other power groups such as unions, consumer groups and regulators.
Mobility barriers—summarized in Table 2— are a corrollary to the
existence of strategic groups. A group structuring carries no meaning
without costs attached to the imitation of strategy by other firms.
Mobility barriers are thus decision variables of firms, and are a way
of defining the set of key strategies available to a firm. The essen-
tial characteristic is relative cost advantage for incumbent firms and
in the limit for a single member group relative cost advantages over
all other competitors. The remedy for cost disadvantage of this kind
probably involves investment expenditure on tangible or intangible
assets with significant elapsed time before the investment comes to
fruition. Moreover, the investment expenditures are irreversible
to the extent that intangible assets are being acquired and there will
typically be considerable uncertainty attached to the outcome of the
investment expenditures.
The similarities between mobility barriers and isolating mecha-
nisms should be noted. The notion of isolating mechanisms generalizes
the concept of mobility barriers and links it to unique firm charac-
teristics such as the possession of idiosyncratic captial.
Insert Table 3 about here
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In essence, Rumelt argues Chat Table 3 represents a simple theory
of strategy which he expresses in the following manner (1981: 19):
A firm's strategy may be explained in terms of the
unexpected events which created (or will create)
potential rents together with the isolating mech-
anisms that (will) act to preserve them.
Rumelt 's isolating mechanisms therefore provide a basis for identifying
groups on the basis of similar clusters of isolating mechanisms on the
grounds that they are the phenomena which make competitive positions
stable and defensible, given the uncertainty arising from unexpected
changes in the task environment and the general environment.
Recently Galbraith and Schendel (1982) also provided an extensive
listing of strategy variables by which strategic groups may be defined
(see Table 4).
Insert Table 4 about here
The following section provides a brief summary of future research
areas.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The existence of strategic groups has a number of implications
for industrial organization. In particular they may be of value in
examining both the traditional theory of entry and oligopoly theory.
The generalization of entry barriers into mobility barriers allows a
richer and more realistic portrayal of the process of entry and the
motives for diversification (cross-entry) as well as providing a link
with firm-level strategy formulation. It also offers an explanation
for persistent intra-industry differences in profit rates. The nature
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of oligopolistic interdependence is illuminated by the pattern of group
memberships and the change of membership over time. In addition, stra-
tegic groups have some interesting parallels with theories of the
growth of the firm, notably those advanced by Penrose (1959) and Downie
(1958).
a. The Structure-Performance Link
The most obvious, although probably the least productive, field of
application for the strategic group concept is the traditional market
structure-performance link. It is now commonly observed that the
structure-performance model is seriously deficient on its own (see, for
example, Hay and Morris (1979: 226)), and that more complex causal
links need to be taken into account. Strategic groups may well improve
this causal modelling process. Further recent strategy research
on diversity and firm performance (Rumelt (1982), Christensen and
Montgomery (1981) and Bettis and Hall (1982)) should also improve the
specification of causal linkages.
b. The Existence of Group Structures
The existing literature appears to justify the existence of group
structures by its contribution to explaining differences in profit
rates. However, it is appropriate to outline the main hypotheses and
questions about the existence of group structures. First, sellers
within an industry are likely to differ systematically in traits other
than size, so that an industry contains groups of firms with distinctive
assets and with different market behavior characteristics. Second,
mobility barriers are a counterpart of group structures and are an
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extension of conventional ideas about entry barriers. Mobility bar-
riers arise from strategic decisions and stem from three main sources;
decisions about strategies in markets, decisions about methods of
supply and the firm's asset configuration, and decisions about the
boundaries and organization of the firm. Third, isolating mechanisms
provide clues about the individual firm's ability to exploit and imi-
tate a strategy commensurate with its underlying skills and resources
and protected by mobility barriers. Fourth, how do strategic groups
form? Are there systematic relationships between, for example, industry
evolution, market growth, and the grouping patterns within an industry?
Or, on the other hand, are these patterns the result of initiatives
taken by individual firms in response Co their own opportunity costs
independently of industry-wide trends?
Porter (1979) provides three explanations of the formation of stra-
tegic groups: (i) investments in building mobility barriers are risky
and firms have different risk-aversion postures; this leads to different
groups defined in terms of R&D and advertising outlays as defensive
mobility barriers; (ii) business units which differ in their relation
to a parent company may differ in goals in ways that lead to strategy
differences; (iii) historical development of an industry (nature of
demand, production technology, product characteristics, etc.) bestows
differential advantages/disadvantages on firms. A fourth possible ex-
planation, relegated by Porter (1979: 217) to a footnote, is exogenous
causes such as technological change:
"Changes in the structure of the industry can either
facilitate group formation, or work to homogenise
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groups. For example, technological changes or
changes in buyer behavior can shift industry boun-
daries bringing entirely new strategic groups into
play in the industry by increasing or decreasing
product substitutability and hence shifting relevant
industry boundaries."
Porter merely hints at the effect of technical change on group for-
mation. An equally important empirical quesion is whether technological
change impacts differently on different strategic groups; viz., does
technological change affect the mobility barriers surrounding one group
to a lesser or greater extent than the barriers (same or different bar-
riers) surrounding another group? If so, does this differential impact
explain performance? This question has not so far been addressed empir-
ically although a priori it would be hypothesized that investments in
R&D and engineering constitute significant mobility barriers in particu-
lar industries.
c. Entry Theory and Mobility of Firms
There are some hypotheses about the process of entry which merit
attention. First, the group specific character of mobility barriers
has strong implications for the entry of firms from outside the
industry. In particular, the presence of groups raises the possibility
of entry paths involving a sequence of moves before a settled position
within the industry is achieved. Where capital requirements are large,
firms will seek to minimize risk by indirect or circuitous moves which
place only limited amounts of capital at risk at . each stage. In
general, entry will be aimed at a particular group or at the creation
of a new group. Second, the queue of potential entrants to a group
will generally consist of established firms in other industries, going
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firms in other groups, and entirely new firms. The position in the
queue will depend on the structural mobility barriers as modified and
extended by the incumbent firms' choice of barrier raising investments.
Third, going firms outside the industry will be the major potential
competitors for the oligopolistic core of dominant firms protected by
product differentiation and absolute cost barriers. .Correspondingly,
new firms— the traditional entrant of Bainsian theory—will appear in
the competitive fringe of oligopolistic markets. Fourth, incumbent
firms deter entry by investing in the creation of new mobility
barriers.
The traditional theory of entry has a number of serious limita-
tions. These difficulties arise from an over-narrow definition of
"entry." Thus, Bain concentrates on entry by new firms. He neglects
take-overs, cross-entry, vertical integration, and additions to capa-
city by existing firms. The group concept allows a richer portrayal of
the entry process from which it is possible to observe types of entrant,
patterns and paths of entry, the effect of entry on the evolution of
the industry, entry deterrence behavior and the manner in which cross-
entry spurs the parallel development of separate industries.
d. Patterns of Rivalrv
In traditional oligopoly theory goal congruence among firms is
assumed even when the problems and costs of communication and the
detection of cheating are discussed, Stigler (1964). By contrast, the
strategic groups thesis argues that not only may there be very little
goal congruence to start with, but that other differences (e.g., cus-
tomers, suppliers, distribution channels) which contribute to strategic
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grouping within the same industry make the formation of oligopolistic
consensus even more difficult. As asymmetry increases, in other words
as the number of observable strategic groups increases, collusion
becomes all the more improbable. The industry becomes segmented but
does not disappear because cross-elasticities of substitution between
products remain unchanged. Oligopolistic interdependence and homogeneity
of firms become recognizable not at the industry level but at the
strategic group level.
Understanding of the patterns of rivalry between groups is not
greatly advanced by the weak assertion that it all depends on market
interdependence. Where groups are defined by market related charac-
teristics like product line or distribution channels, then market
interdependence is likely to be lower rather than higher. Where group
configurations arise from non-market sources then the potential for
market overlap will be that much greater.
In general, however, oligopoly theory has lacked a "realistic"
testable framework within which patterns of rivalry can be observed
over time. The various theories have been unique constructs and the
multitude of case studies have lacked generality. Strategic group
analysis conducted longitudinally may provide us with a framework to
allow the categorization of strategic changes, an objective analysis
of the position of a firm within an industry and a way of assessing
industry evolution. The prospect, however, merely tantalizes. Group
analysis requires further taxonomy development before group structures
can be compared intertemporally. Strategic groups like game theory may
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remain an elegant and inspired form of language, but we should be aware
of the empty boxes within the matrices.
The principal hypotheses that merit attention are: group members
are likely to respond in similar ways to disturbances from outside the
group; the effect of groups on rivalry may depend upon the number and
size distribution of groups and on the market interdependence between
groups; and firms within a given group can recognize mutual dependence
and coordinate their behavior more effectively than can firms in dif-
ferent groups.
e. The Theory of Growth of the Firm
Strategic group analysis has interesting parallels with the theory
of growth of the firm as first articulated by Downie, Penrose, and
Marris more than twenty years ago. Downie sought to explain the sources
of efficiency dispersion within an industry, the consequences for com-
petition, and the role of innovation in the competitive process. His
contribution was to link growth of the firm and profitability, and to
put growth firmly in the context of the competitive process in which he
had a clear place for oligopolistic interdependence. Downie's view of
the innovation mechanism has been criticized for its apparent unreality
in ascribing innovation to the less efficient firms, but it requires
only to add mobility barriers and patterns of cross entry to recover
his basic results.
"Distinctive competence" is a phrase much used by policy analysts.
It is usually taken to refer to those unique and distinctive features
of an organization which can be translated into a competitive advantage
-26-
in the market. The thrust of the Penrose argument is that certain
organizational and managerial characteristics facilitate successful
corporate strategy initiatives and the subsequent development of cor-
porate structures.
From this background it is possible to pose various hypotheses:
strategic groups may stimulate the examination of the interrelation
between business units, their corporate parents and their corporate
siblings in analyzing the evolution of industries; strategic groups
provide a means for analyzing changes in industry structure over time
and can provide predictions of the mechanisms by which structural
change will take place; changes in strategic groupings and in mobility
barriers can eventually be brought about by rates of profit which
differ systematically between groups.
CONCLUSIONS
The theory of strategic groups and associated mobility barriers is
related to the structure of industries and the strategic behavior of
firms within their industries. The group concept appears to be a
supply side concept insofar as it defines structures within industries,
but is in all its essentials a market behavior or conduct concept
fitting neatly between the supply idea of an industry and the demand
idea of a market. The defining characteristics of strategic groups
arise from the nature of the mobility barriers and isolating mechanisms
which protect the groups. The three sources of mobility barriers are
market-related strategies, general supply characteristics of the
industry, and the organizational and boundary choices of the firm—each
of them being decision variables for the firm.
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Strategic groups pose a number of interesting research challenges.
The first to be explored and the most obvious one is the contribution
it makes to the market structure-performance link. Of more promise are
other areas; the existence and evolution of group structures and their
relationship to the evolution of industries, their contribution to the
theory of entry, the queue of potential entrants and the alternative
entry paths, the patterns of rivalry in oligopolistic markets, and our
understanding of the growth and evolutionary patterns of firms.
The emergence of the strategic group concept and the increasing
research attention being paid to the boundary areas between industrial
organization, strategic marketing, administrative behavior and strategic
management suggests closer attention to the firm as the unit of analy-
sis. The difficulty of applying rigorous research techniques in the
area of strategic decision-making is extreme. The problems of con-
trolling for exogenous variables, the lack of comparability among the
units of analysis and the disparate nature of these units, and the
changing nature of opportunity sets and the environment generally re-
stricts the. ability of researchers to make causal connections between
sets of variables. All these problems are compounded by the lack of
3
suitable data bases for research. There may well be a continuing trend
towards in depth studies of firms and their industry settings in an
attempt to apply control procedures to fewer variables and to explore
the character and texture of strategic choices in ways impossible for
statistical analysis to achieve. The effect of strategic groups is to
restore strategic decisions to the center of the structure and perfor-
mance arena and to re-emphasize the firm as an important unit of analysis
-28-
FOOTNOTES
See also the notion of "uncertain inimitabiiity " advanced by
Lippraann and Rumelt (1981).
2
Rumelt (1981) goes further in explaining the uniqueness of firms
by generalizing from mobility barriers to "isolating mechanims" and the
notion of "idiosyncratic capital."
3
Honorable exceptions to this are the P1MS Program of the
Strategic Planning Institute, and the Program for Industry and Company
Analysis (PICA) at Harvard.
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TABLE 1
STRATEGIC GROUPS: PREVIOUS STUDIES
Studv Industry Bas is fi )C Strategic
Group Fior mat ion
Product L ine BasisHunt (1972) "White Goods
- degree of product
diversification
- differences in product
differentiation
- extent of vertical integration
Newman (1973,
1978)
34 4 digit
"Producer Goods"
Industries
:
Chemical Processes
Degree of Vertical
Integration
Porter (1973) 38 3 digit
"Consumer Goods"
Industries
Relative Size of Firm
- Leader/Follower Classification
Hatten (1974)
Hat ten and
Schendel (1977)
Brewing Industry Manufacturing Variahles
- Number, Age, Capital Intensity
of Plants
Marketing Variables
- Number of brands, price, and
receivables /sales
Structural Variables
- 8-firm concentration ratio
- firm size
Hatten, Schendel Brewing Industry
and Cooper (1978)
Manufacturing
,
Marketing and
Financial Variables (Leverage,
Merger /Acquisition Behavior)
Caves and Pugel
(1980)
U.S. Manufacturing
Industry—Sample
Relative Size of Firm
Oster (1982) 19 Consumer Goods
Industries from
Compustat
Product Strategy
- Advertising/Sales Ratio
Ryans and
Wittink (1982)
Airline Industry Financial Strategy
Clustering of Residuals from
Capital Asset Pricing Model
(Security Returns)
Baird and
Sudharsan
(1983)
Office Equipment/
Electronic Computing
Financial Strategy Variables
- Leverage, Current Ratio,
Return on Assets, Dividend
Payment Ratio, Times Interest
Earned, Size
Primeaux (1983) Textiles
Petroleum
Size
Investment Behavior
Howell and
Frazier (1983)
Medical Supply
and Equipment
Customer Groups Served
Customer Needs Served
(due to Abell (1980))
TABLE 2
SOURCES OF MOBILITY BARRIERS
Market Related Industry Supply Characteristics
Strategies Characteristics of Firms
Product Line Economies of scale: Ownership
User- technologies production Organization
Structure
Market- segmentation marketing
Control Systems
Distribution channels administration
Management Skills
Brand names Manufacturing
processes Boundaries of
Geographic coverage *
R&D Capability - firms
Selling Systems
Marketing & - diversification
Distribution
Systems - vertical integration
Firm Size
Relationships with
influence groups
TABLE 3
RUMELT'S ISOLATING MECHANISMS
Elements of Strategic Position
Sources of Potential Rents Isolating Mechanisms
(Unexpected Events)
Change's in Technology Causal Ambiguity
Changes in Relative Prices Sunk Costs and Limited Markets
Changes in Consumer Tastes Switching and Search Costs
Changes in Law, Tax and Regulation Consumer and Producer Learning
Discoveries and Inventions Ideosynchrat ic Investment
Team Embodied Skills
Unique Resources
Special Information
Patents and Trademarks
Reputation and Image
Adapted from Rumelt (1981)
TABLE 4
POSSIBLE STRATEGY VARIABLES FOR DEFINING STRATEGIC GROUPS
Controllable variables : Strategy posture/Strategy change variables
Marketing: Price, Advertising and Selling Expenses,
Breadth of product-line, Competitive
Positioning, Product R&D
Production: Forward/backward integration; Capacity
Utilization; Cost Structure; Process R&D
Investment: Capital Investment and its Rate of Change •
Uncontrollable Variables
Environmental level
- Technology
- Macro-economy
- Legal and regulatory structures
Adapted from Schendel and Galbraith (1982); Ackoff (1970); Dill (1958);
Aldrich (1979)
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